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Glossary
Dysfunction The opposite of function: mechanisms,
roles, effects, utilities, and conditions that do not
contribute to or may even negatively affect structural
stability.
Function Mechanisms, roles, effects, utilities, and
conditions that contribute to the maintenance of a given
structure.
Functional Differentiation Process of specialization
of the parts or mechanisms of a given structure to
perform different functions.
Functional Equivalence When the same function can
be performed by different parts or mechanisms of a
given structure.
Functional Requisites The critical conditions needed
for the existence of a given structure.
Holistic Functionalism Functionalist approaches that
place the emphasis on the explanation of macro-
structural social processes.
Individualistic Functionalism Functionalist
approaches departing from the assumption that social
structures exist for the benefit of the individual.
Social Darwinism The application of Darwinian
concepts and principles for the explanation of social
processes.
Teleofunction A function that is goal oriented,
intentional, and consciously performed.
Introduction
Functionalism is one of the major traditions in scientific
analysis and explanation. It has its main origins in biology
and has been very influential in the development of
the social sciences, including human geography. Func-
tionalist approaches have also been very important in a
wide range of other disciplinary fields, including psych-
ology, engineering, architecture and planning, and
archeology. This article places emphasis on functionalism
in the social sciences, looking at the development of its
main strands: functionalism and structural functionalism.
It also provides a brief discussion on the concept of
function, as well as a reference to the reemergence of
functionalism in system theories, and more recently in
neofunctionalism.
The main tenet of functionalism is that scientific an-
alysis and explanation must focus on the functional
integration of the differentiated component parts of a
given structure or whole. It places the emphasis on the
role played by functions or consequences of substructures
and processes in fulfilling the needs of the system of
which they are part. The earliest forms of functionalist
explanation were developed in biology and focused on
the functions played by the different organs in the
maintenance of vital equilibrium in living beings. Bio-
logical or organismic functionalism became the model
that inspired the development of functionalism in other
scientific areas, most particularly in sociology and an-
thropology. However, although functionalism is often
understood to be a unified school or approach, in fact, the
functionalist field is home to divergent and even mutu-
ally contradictory positions, which has fueled protracted
and still unresolved controversies. The divergence con-
cerns in particular the balance in the emphasis that dif-
ferent strands of functionalism place either on functions
or structures. Thus, when the focus is mainly on the
former, the analysis seeks to explain the role that a cer-
tain component plays in the maintenance of the totality
of which it forms part; while in the case of the latter, the
aim is to explain the persistence of the structure under
consideration by focusing on the functions played by one
or more component parts. Moreover, the concept of
function itself is the object of continued controversy, as
it has often been applied with very different and even
contradictory meanings. Functionalism, and its re-
formulation as structural functionalism, provided the
prevailing paradigm for the social sciences during the
1950s and 1960s, but became the object of sustained
criticism since the 1970s in a context of theoretical and
methodological diversification. Although functionalism
lost its dominant position, functionalist principles con-
tinue to inspire the development of a rich diversity
of theoretical frameworks, including systems theory,
some strands of Marxist analysis, and neofunctionalist
approaches in the social sciences.
The Development of Functionalism in the
Social Sciences
Although the genealogy of functionalist theorizing can be
traced back to Greek philosophy, the development of
systematic functionalism in modern scientific thought is
associated with the work of the French paleontologist
Georges Cuvier (1769–1832) who eventually became the
father of functionalist biology. In his study of animal
fossils, Cuvier developed the notion that animal organs
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can be explained by their functions as parts of the ani-
mal’s integrated whole. He rejected the evolutionary
theories of the time, such as Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s,
because he believed that any transformation of an ani-
mal’s component parts would adversely affect the func-
tional integration of its organism and hamper its very
survival. Cuvier argued that there exist certain functional
conditions (‘conditions of existence’) that restrict the
form that animals can take given that the form and
function of each animal part is integral to the organism as
a whole. A different conceptual source of functional
analysis in social science can be traced back to the Ro-
manticist and historicist traditions, and particularly to
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). Hegel’s
concept of the uniqueness of the absolute spirit inspired
an idealistic notion of structure, with component parts,
interrelations, and functions derived not from organismic
analogies but from a philosophical conceptualization of
human history. Along these lines, the sociologist Karl
Mannheim (1893–1947) developed an influential body of
work where the concepts of structure and function
played a central role.
Nevertheless, functionalism in the social sciences has
been mainly shaped by biological thinking. Thus, it
would be another Frenchman, August Comte (1798–
1857) who would get inspiration from biological func-
tionalism to develop a functionalist science of society,
which he called initially ‘social physics’ and later ‘soci-
ology’. Comte’s main preoccupation was to understand
the principles underlying social order in the context of
rapid social transformation characterizing nineteenth-
century Europe. He proposed that the study of society
should distinguish between social dynamics (social
change) and social statics (social structure), and he
adopted the language of biological functionalism mainly
for the latter. He assumed that there is a correspondence
between social and biological matter in analytical terms,
and comparing society with a biological organism he
argued that social structures can be explained by focusing
on how their component parts (i.e., individuals, families,
religions, and social classes) contribute to the mainten-
ance of the body social.
The systematic application of biological functionalist
principles to explain social order was further advanced
by Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), a leading exponent of
social Darwinism. Spencer also established an analogy
between social and animal organisms as systems that
evolve through a process of increasing structural com-
plexity and functional differentiation. According to him,
social institutions mirror animal organs and would have
the function to meet the survival needs of the social
system. However, though Spencer shared Comte’s con-
cern with identifying the functional requisites that make
social order possible, he departed from different as-
sumptions and produced a very different response. He
accepted that in the case of organic matter the parts have
the function to preserve the systemic whole, but he
counter argued that in the case of society the whole exists
for the benefit of the individual members. Spencer’s so-
cial Darwinism was a combination of evolutionary theory,
functional analysis, and individualistic liberalism.
Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) rejected Spencer’s so-
cial Darwinism but relied both on Spencer and Comte
for developing a theory of society modeled on the main
principles of organismic functionalism. Durkheim’s main
concern was centered on identifying the mechanisms of
social integration that are needed for the preservation of
social systems, which he believed could be classified as
the cultural, structural, interpersonal, and cognitive
functions of integrated social structures. For him, the
explanation of social facts, which are the objects of study
in sociology, requires identifying both their causes and
their functions in relation to their relevant social struc-
tures. Durkheim applied this approach to a wide range of
‘social facts’, such as the incest taboo or crime punish-
ment, seeking to identify existing correspondences be-
tween these facts and the needs of the social organism.
Thus, for instance, according to Durkheim the punish-
ment of crimes is caused by the intensity of the collective
sentiments offended by such acts, but in turn punishment
is a social fact that has the function of maintaining the
level of intensity of such sentiments in the body social,
which might otherwise be weakened and affect the in-
tegrity of the social system. For Durkheim, the main
focus of sociological analysis should be on the mech-
anisms of solidarity and cohesion that help to explain the
persistence of harmonious social systems.
A central principle derived from biological func-
tionalism for the study of society is the notion that social
systems tend to maintain a state of internal equilibrium
(homeostasis), which underlies the works of Comte,
Spencer, and Durkheim. One of the key social theorists
that developed this principle further was Vilfredo Pareto
(1848–1923), who built on Le´on Walras’ (1834–1910)
economic theory of general equilibrium. Pareto argued
that equilibrium was the normal state of social systems,
and focused on the functions or ‘utilities’ of particular
social phenomena in the achievement of overall systemic
stability. He emphasized the importance of (a) social
elements, (b) their distribution, (c) their change over
time, and (d) their combination and interdependence
with other elements in the process leading the social
system toward its normal state of equilibrium. The
heteronomous interaction between different elements of
the system would lead to unintended, incidental effects
that may have utility for the equilibrium of the system
but are independent from the interests, intentions, sen-
timents, or desires of social actors. An additional con-
tribution of Pareto to functionalist analysis was the
further specification of the notion of functional
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alternatives or equivalents, that is, that the same systemic
function can be fulfilled by different social mechanisms.
He applied this concept in his theory of political elitism,
where he argued that the maintenance of political equi-
librium by the ruling elite takes place through a number
of mechanisms, including co-optation, diplomacy, fraud,
corruption, and force (complex forms of coercion).
Through these alternative but nonexclusive mechanisms
the ruling elite enforces its monopoly of power, which is
the natural state of the system, although this equilibrium
is not enduring and is subject to periodic revolutionary
changes leading to the replacement of the ruling elite
(elite circulation).
The development of a systematic functionalist an-
alysis in anthropology was mainly due to Bronislaw
Malinowski (1884–1942), who both drew on and intro-
duced significant modifications to Durkheim’s frame-
work. In particular, Malinowski went beyond establishing
an analogy between organic matter and society to ac-
tually ground his analysis on the biological needs of
human beings. For him, social institutions and cultural
traits are functions developed by society to fulfill primary
biological needs, such as nutrition or reproduction, thus
reversing Durkheim’s efforts to base the explanation of
social facts exclusively on other social facts. Moreover,
Malinowski also rejected Durkheim’s derivation of
functions from their role in maintaining social structures
and adopted a utilitarian and psychologistic approach to
the definition of social functions. Thus, Malinowski’s
functionalism postulated that traditions, social activities,
and collective processes were in fact developments ori-
ented at the satisfaction of individual needs, which to




Although the interrelation between the notions of func-
tion and structure is part and parcel of functionalist
thought, the relative weight given to them in the analysis
has led to the distinction between functionalism and
structural functionalism, where the latter places greater
emphasis on structural aspects such as systemic inte-
gration. The foundations for the emergence of structural
functionalism can be traced back to Durkheim, and es-
pecially to the work that he carried out in collaboration
with his disciple and nephew Marcel Mauss (1872–1950).
In particular, in their work on human forms of classifi-
cation and symbolic thought they developed the argu-
ment that the human mind derives its systems of mental
classification from existing social structures. In their
perspective, the existing groupings and divisions in the
social structures determine the modes in which the
human mind develops its own system of classification. For
instance, the notion of time in this perspective is shaped
by the particular social structures characteristic of a
given social group, and therefore it will differ between
different societies. Thus, for Durkheim a calendar reflects
the actual rhythm of social activities in a given social
system, while in turn it has the function of ensuring the
regularity of such activities. This work would exercise a
powerful influence on the development of the structural-
functionalist approach, which is primarily associated with
English anthropologist Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown (1881–
1955). He claimed that there is no functionalism as such
but only structural functionalism, and argued that the
concept of function necessarily implies that of structure,
namely a system of interrelated components that is
maintained by the activities of the different parts. Rad-
cliffe-Brown also held that social structures are natural
systems of their own, composed of the mutual inter-
relations between individual members. In addition
to Radcliffe-Brown, the British school of structural-
functionalist anthropology was also populated by other
key figures such as Meyer Fortes (1906–83), Edward
E. Evans-Pritchard (1902–73), and Max Gluckman
(1911–75).
However, structural functionalism reached its height
with the work of American sociologist Talcott Parsons
(1902–79), who had become acquainted with the work of
Durkheim during the 1920s as a student of Malinowski.
Parsons went on to elaborate a complex synthesis of the
work of Durkheim, Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto, and
Alfred Marshall, aimed at providing an integrated and
holistic theory of society. Parsons’ holistic functionalism
brings together elements of a voluntaristic theory of
human action, derived mainly from Weber, Pareto,
Marshall, and a particular reading of Freud, with Dur-
kheim’s concern with the integration of social systems.
Thus, Parsons recognized the importance of individual
agency and will in the pursuit of goal-oriented behavior,
with individual human beings having the capacity of
making choices to achieve their objectives, but he
maintained that the choices available to individual agents
are circumscribed by the physical, cultural, and social
environment, and shaped by social values and norms.
Parsons defined functions as those mechanisms that allow
the adjustment of the system to the external environ-
ment, and postulated that all social systems have
four functional requirements, namely (1) adaptation,
(2) goal attainment, (3) integration, and (4) latency
(systemic equilibrium). According to him, complex socie-
ties are structured as a hierarchy of systems and sub-
systems, where each specific system must meet the four
functional requirements in order to (1) adapt to the
physical environment by securing the resources needed
to achieve its goals, (2) appropriately manage such re-
sources, (3) provide for the effective coordination of the
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system’s components and interrelationships to secure
integration, and (4) maintain the system’s overall equi-
librium. Complex social systems develop specialized,
highly differentiated means to respond to these four
functional requirements, where the key mechanism is the
adaptation of individual members of society to the sys-
tem’s social values and norms through socialization.
Parsons normative functionalism and his emphasis on
system stability informed much urban planning and
design since the 1950s, heavily influencing the physical
shaping and social organization of urban landscapes.
Robert K. Merton (1910–2003) reviewed Parsons’
theory in a number of areas. First, he provided a coun-
terbalance to what was perceived to be an overemphasis
on structure in Parsons’ approach, and placed more
weight on the concepts of ‘manifest’ and ‘latent’ functions
that give individual agency a higher profile in the overall
configuration. Merton further specified these concepts:
manifest functions are those mechanisms that contribute
to the adjustment and adaptation of the system and are
the result of intentional, conscious human actions, while
latent functions are those that are neither intentional nor
consciously carried out by the actors. Second, Merton
also reviewed a number of implicit assumptions in clas-
sical functional analysis, such as that all components in a
social structure fulfill certain functions needed for the
stability and survival of the system. He argued that there
exist certain components that do not fulfill any functions,
while other elements that he called ‘dysfunctions’ may
actually have a negative effect on the system (also termed
malfunctions). Conversely, he also reasserted the prin-
ciple of functional equivalence, namely that the same
function can be performed by a number of different
components of the structure.
Through the work of Parsons and Merton, structural
functionalism became the dominant sociological orien-
tation in the US during the 1950s and 1960s. It came to
include a significant number of prominent sociologists,
such as Kingsley Davis (1908–97), Wilbert Moore (1914–
87), David Aberle (1918–2004), Lewis Coser (1913–
2003), and Marion Levy (1918–2002) among others.
The structural-functionalist school also became very
influential in the development of the social sciences in
developing countries during the post World War II per-
iod. For instance, the Italian sociologist Gino Germani
(1911–79), who spent a period at Harvard University
working with Parsons after escaping from Fascist Italy in
the 1940s, significantly contributed to the establishment
and development of sociology in Latin America since the
late 1950s from his base at the University of Buenos
Aires, Argentina. During the same period in Brazil,
Floresta´n Ferna´ndez (1920–95) developed a highly re-
spected school at the University of Sao Paulo, blending
classical Marxist and Weberian sociology with func-
tionalist analysis.
The influence of the functionalist and structural-
functionalist traditions in human geography has been less
conspicuous in terms of prominent figures or the devel-
opment of schools of geographical thought. It is perhaps
in the field of political geography, and particularly in the
study of territorial boundaries and international relations,
where an explicitly functionalist geography can be found.
Thus, keynote geographers, such as Russian-born French
geographer Jean Iona Gottman (1915–94), developed
functionalist explanations in the fields of urban and
political geography, and particularly in his studies on the
roles (functions) played by geographical (topography,
hydrographic networks, etc.) and social (economic, cul-
tural, and political) forces on international political sta-
bility. Gottman argued that the political partitioning of
the world can be explained as the balance resulting from
the interaction of two main forces, circulation (com-
munication and movement) and iconography (the shared
system of symbols of a given population). Along similar
lines, the American geographer Richard Hartshorne
(1899–1992) put forward his theory of territorial inte-
gration where he postulated that the main role of states
would be to maintain stability by counteracting de-
stabilizing centrifugal forces, such as disruptive physical
features (e.g., mountains, forests) or social characteristics
(e.g., low population, language barriers), that provoke the
fragmentation of political units and foster intranational
conflicts. Building on both Gottman and Hartshorne,
American geographer Stephen Barr Jones (1903–84)
proposed a unified field theory aimed at bridging the gap
between morphology and function in political geography.
Functionalism has also been influential in the fields
of urban geography and planning, where an explicitly
functionalist conceptualization has been applied to a
range of issues, including the study of neighborhoods,
communities, and urban areas, housing policies, and
territorial governance. Despite the fact that there are few
other references in the literature to an explicitly ‘func-
tionalist’ or ‘structural-functionalist geography’, and that
an in-depth debate about the impact or implications of
functionalism and structural functionalism for human
geography is largely missing, many principles and con-
cepts associated with the approach have been integrated
in different ways in the work of human geographers. In
particular, functionalist concepts have informed much
urban-geographical work on the spatial dimensions and
scales of social order and disorder, organization, and
conflict.
Criticism, Demise, and Revival of
Functionalism
Since the 1970s functionalism, and in particular struc-
tural functionalism, became the subject of strong
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criticism on a number of fronts. First, because of its
organismic analogies in the conceptualization of social
systems and its emphasis on structural equilibrium and
social order functionalist analysis was charged with been
unable to account for social change. Second, for similar
reasons functionalism was criticized as being an in-
trinsically conservative approach because of its emphasis
on system integration, stability, and social consensus that
would render unobservable the internal contradictions
of social systems. Third, according to the critics func-
tionalists would be unable to account for the causes
driving the process of structural and functional differ-
entiation that is at the center of functionalist analysis and
they would have conflated the concepts of cause and
function. Moreover, most functionalist explanations
would be either tautological (the existence of a given
function is explained as a response to structural needs,
while the maintenance of the structure is explained as
being the result of the functions) or teleological (the
emergence of structures is explained as a response to the
ends or needs existing in a given system). These and
other criticisms of functionalism became increasingly
louder during the 1970s, at the same time that the social
sciences were experiencing a rapid diversification and
fragmentation of theoretical and methodological ap-
proaches. According to some commentators this process
would have led to the demise of functionalism to the
point that it would have almost disappeared from the
social sciences by the 1980s.
However, despite its critics functionalism has survived
in several areas of scientific analysis and explanation. For
instance, the work of functionalist political geographers
like Hartshorne has been influential in the development
of research on comparative border studies and regional
integration (and geopolitical studies at large), a very
dynamic interdisciplinary field, particularly in contin-
ental Europe. More generally, the German sociologist
Niklas Luhmann (1927–98) developed a radical re-
formulation of Talcott Parsons’ approach aimed at pro-
viding a comprehensive theory of society by bringing
together elements from cybernetics, neurobiology, and
German idealist philosophy that has also influenced de-
velopments in human geography. Luhmann proposed a
theory of social systems whereby human beings are
conceptualized not as part of society but as part of its
environment. For this reason Luhmann’s theory has been
labeled posthumanist, as its main thrust is to de-link the
social from the human, breaking away from classical
anthropocentrism. In turn, society is defined as a closed
communication system, self-referential and reflexive, and
the function of the (economic, legal, political, and other)
subsystems is that of reducing the increasing complexity
of information flows to ensure system stability and
survival. He also stressed the centrality of functional
equivalence in the maintenance of systemic equilibrium.
Luhmann’s theory has informed new work in human
geography, particularly in Europe and especially in
Germany, aimed at developing new theoretical ap-
proaches to sociospatial analysis, although these authors
do not draw as much inspiration from Luhmann’s func-
tionalism as they do from his sophisticated intertwining
of systems theory and neurobiology.
While Luhmann’s functionalism has clear conservative
overtones, Oxford philosopher Gerry Cohen has argued
for the application of functionalist analysis within the
framework of Marxist theory. For Cohen, although
functional analysis could not help to explain the original
cause of a certain social structure (i.e., an institution or
cultural trait that contributes to the reproduction of the
capitalist social order), it helps to explain the perman-
ence of such structure over time. An ongoing debate
prompted by Cohen’s work focuses on the compatibility
of functionalist principles with the Marxist analytical
framework. In this connection, some commentators have
pointed out the influence of functionalist concepts in the
work of Marxist geographer David Harvey, for instance
in his explanation of suburbanization processes and their
role in contributing toward the stability of the capitalist
system by fostering consumption, commodity fetishism,
and preempting revolutionary change. However, perhaps
the most explicit and comprehensive attempt to revitalize
and reformulate functionalist analysis has been carried
out by sociologists Jeffrey Alexander and Paul Colomy,
who have actually termed their approach ‘neofunction-
alism’. These authors aim at reinvigorating Talcott
Parsons’ ambitions of producing an integrated and
multidimensional theory of society by relating it to other
theoretical frameworks, preserving and at the same taking
critical distance from Parsons’ functionalism. These
efforts have encountered significant resistance and
prompted and ongoing and open debate about the use-
fulness and soundness of functionalism for contemporary
social science.
The Concept of Function
One of the main criticisms to functionalism is the fact
that the very concept of function is ambiguous, a carrier
of multiple meanings, and is often applied in an unri-
gorous fashion without properly defining its specific
content. Already in the 1940s Robert Merton warned
about the terminological confusion affecting functionalist
approaches, which often used ‘function’ as synonymous
for a range of terms, including use, utility, purpose,
motive, intention, aim, effect, and consequences. How-
ever, it is worth noting that this confusing application of
‘function’ has not been a preserve of the social sciences,
and has also been identified in other areas, including
biology and techno-scientific disciplines. As discussed
Functionalism (Including Structural Functionalism) 281
Author's personal copy
above, in the particular case of the social sciences one
the main precisions introduced to specify the concept of
function is that of manifest (conscious or intentional, also
called teleofunctions) and latent (unintended and inci-
dental) functions. While the former places emphasis
on agency and goal-oriented social action, the latter is
concerned with structural, unplanned effects, on social
systems. In a recent methodological debate Mahner and
Bunge have identified several distinct but logically
interconnected meanings of ‘function’ used in biology,
the social sciences, and techno-scientific disciplines. An
important specification of the concept proposed by these
authors is that ‘function’ can refer either to the mech-
anisms that are responsible for a given fact or process or
to the roles and effects of a given social element in re-
lation to the social system. The distinction is that while
the former would allow to develop proper scientific ex-
planations, as it identifies a mechanism that explains how
and why a given fact or result has occurred, the latter
would at most offer descriptive accounts or exemplifi-
cations of known patterns of phenomena, but not scien-
tific explanations because they lack a reference to the
mechanism responsible for the fact or process under
analysis.
See also: Darwinism (and Social Darwinism);
Determinism/Environmental Determinism; Gottmann, J.;
Hartshorne, R.; Harvey, D.; Lamarck(ian)ism;
Posthumanism/Posthumanistic Geographies;
Structuration Theory; Structurationist Geography;
Systems; Systems Theory.
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